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Abstract. This paper describes an implemented system that is designed to sup-
port the deployment of applications offering distributed services, comprising a 
number of distributed components. This is achieved by creating high level 
placement and topology descriptions that drive tools to deploy applications 
consisting of components running on multiple hosts. The system addresses is-
sues of heterogeneity by providing abstractions over host-specific attributes 
yielding a homogeneous run-time environment into which components may be 
deployed. The run-time environments provide secure binding mechanisms that 
permit deployed components to bind to stored data and services on the hosts on 
which they are running. 
1 Introduction 
This paper describes an implemented system that is designed to support the deploy-
ment of applications offering distributed services, comprising a number of distributed 
components. A number of requirements for flexible service deployment may be iden-
tified, including: 
• an architectural description of software components, the hosts on which they are 
to execute, and the interconnections between them [1] 
• the ability to enact the architectural description to obtain a running deployment 
consisting of the specified set of componentsrequiring: 
! the ability to install and execute code on remote hosts 
! a security mechanism to prevent malicious parties from deploying and execut-
ing harmful agents, and deployed components from interfering with each 
other, either accidentally or maliciously 
• support for component implementation using standard programming languages 
and appropriate programming models 
• the ability for components to interface with off-the-shelf (COTS) components 
already deployed 
Clearly, security considerations are a major issue in any flexible deployment infra-
structure. Our system introduces new security domains, called thin servers, which can 
be placed within an existing network. Thin servers permit flexible and dynamic 
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placement of both code and data by authorised users, in a secure and simple manner. 
They support a model of global computation in which objects have global identity, 
and the programmer may define the physical domain in which code is executed. Thin 
servers do not replace existing hosts, but are instead used to complement existing 
infrastructure to increase its usability and effectiveness. Indeed, thin servers can be 
co-hosted on conventional servers, and the services offered by them may be indistin-
guishable from conventional services. 
In order to permit deployed components to be assembled into appropriate topolo-
gies and communicate with each other, the components must exhibit some degree of 
interface standardisation. In the implementation described here, communication is via 
asynchronous channels that may be dynamically rebound to arbitrary components 
either by the components themselves or by suitably privileged external parties. 
All software applications are subject to evolutionary pressure. In order to respond 
to these pressures, it may be necessary to adapt parameters of the deployed services, 
including, but not limited to, the placement of components and data on machines and 
the components interconnection topology. 
This paper describes a framework that permits distributed services to be described, 
deployed and evolved in distributed contexts. It provides binding mechanisms that 
permit components to bind to local code, data and processes, including inter-node, 
inter-component bindings. When combined, these provide a run-time environment 
within which a deployed application may evolve. The framework contributes to the 
state of the art in six areas, providing: 
1. mechanisms for deploying code and data in a distributed environment 
2. abstractions over node specific attributes yielding a homogeneous run-time envi-
ronment for deployed components 
3. safe binding mechanisms so that deployed components can bind to stored data and 
services on the nodes on which they are running 
4. mechanisms for describing and deploying distributed applications consisting of 
components running on multiple nodes 
5. the ability to evolve the topology of deployed applications and components 
6. security mechanisms that permit a wide range of policies to be implemented rang-
ing from liberal to draconian 
The deployment framework described here is based on an enabling infrastructure 
called Cingal1 [2, 3]. Cingal itself addresses points 1-3 above, while the deployment 
infrastructure adds support for points 4-6. 
2 The Cingal Computational Model 
Cingal supports a conceptually simple computational model in which each thin server 
provides the following: 
• a port to which a bundle of code and data may be sent for execution 
• authentication mechanisms, preventing unauthorised code from executing 
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• a content addressable store 
• symbolic name binders for data and processes 
• an extensible collection of execution environments called machines 
• channel-based asynchronous inter-machine communication 
• a capability system controlling access to stored data, machines and bindings. 
The computational model is illustrated in Fig 1, which shows two hosts: a conven-
tional host that might be running Windows or MacOS, and a thin server running the 
Cingal infrastructure. In order to execute code on a thin server, an OS process on the 
conventional host sends a bundle of code and data to the thin server where it is re-
ceived by a daemon known as the fire daemon. 
 
Fig 1: Cingal computational model 
The fire daemon authenticates the bundle using mechanisms described later and, 
provided that it is authenticated, the bundle is fired. This causes a new operating 
system process to be created, which executes the code in the bundle. This process, 
which we term a machine, contains the code in the bundle and machine infrastructure 
containing code and data structures provided by the thin server. The infrastructure 
provides mechanisms to allow executing bundles to access the services provided by 
thin servers, to interface with the protection mechanisms, and to permit inter-machine 
communication channels to be established. The infrastructure may be invoked from 
other processes via an interface called the machine channel and from the executing 
bundle via an API (called the machine API) provided to the bundle when it is initial-
ised2. 
The thin server infrastructure includes a number of services that may be invoked 
from bundles executing within machines. These are the store, store binder, process 
binder and valid entity repository (VER), providing storage, binding and certificate 
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storage respectively. A running bundles interactions with these services are restricted 
via a capability protection scheme mediated via library code in the infrastructure. 
The bundle is the only user-level entity that may be executed in Cingal. It is pas-
sive, consisting of a closure of code and data and a set of bindings naming the data. In 
the current implementation bundles are XML-encoded, as illustrated in Fig 2. Each 
bundle carries an authentication element with attributes entity and signature. The 
entity identifies the bundle using a globally unique identifier (GUID) implemented 
via an MD5 key. The signature is used by the security infrastructure. In the current 
implementation, code may be either MIME-encoded Java classes or JavaScript 
source. In principle, any programming language could be used for encoding compo-
nents, provided that the appropriate run-time support was provided. When a bundle is 
fired, execution begins at the entry point specified by the entry attribute of the code 
element, which specifies code that implements a standard interface. The data section 
of a bundle, known as its payload, comprises data with each datum having a unique 
id attribute. In the example the bundle carries one datum named ToDoList. It is com-
mon for bundles to carry other bundles in their payload, in order to install bundles in 
the store or fire them in other machines. 
Subject to the capability protection scheme, bundles may carry out any arbitrary 
computation that they are encoded to perform, including the provision of network 
services. 
<BUNDLE> 
 <AUTHENTICATION  entity="19730129df7447eb91509" 
        signature="DQoew3rasZ9wu9ySLGU"/> 
 <CODE entry="uk.ac.stand.cingal.Runner" type="java"> 
  <CLASS name="uk.ac.stand.cingal.Runner"> 
   MamF2YS9sYW5nL09ia 
  </CLASS> 
 </CODE> 
 <DATA><DATUM id="ToDoList"> 
   <TODOLIST> 
    <TASK guid="urn:cingal:325444" type="RUN"> 
     <DATUM id="StoreGuid"> 
      Lvcxk3wnAIUN 
     </DATUM> 
    </TASK> 
   </TODOLIST> 
  </DATUM></DATA> 
</BUNDLE> 
Fig 2: An example bundle 
The store provided by each machine is a collection of passive data and supports the 
storage of arbitrary bundles. So that a bundle may be retrieved, a key in the form of a 
GUID is returned by the store on its insertion. If that key is later presented, the origi-
nal bundle is returned. Stores do not support any update operations. Where the effects 
of update are required by an application, these may be obtained using binders. 
Cingal thin servers provide two kinds of symbolic name binders: a store binder for 
naming entities in the store and a process binder for naming active machines. Both 
provide the ability to manipulate bindings though symbolic names and provide stan-
dard put, remove and get operations. 
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Cingal supports asynchronous message-oriented inter-machine communication. All 
communication is via channels that support conventional read and write operations. 
Each machine has associated with it a minimum of two channels as shown in Fig 1. 
The first is called the machine channel and is used to communicate with the machine 
infrastructure. The second is called the default channel and is used to communicate 
with the bundle running within the machine. An interface to the default channel is 
returned to its progenitor whenever a bundle is fired. The fired bundle may access the 
default channel via the machine API. 
The channel established between a bundle and its progenitor is normally used for 
diagnostics and the passing of parameters. In order to accommodate change and dy-
namic deployment, the Cingal computational model supports named channels be-
tween entities. This idea stems from Milners π-calculus [4]. Using named channels, 
individual executing bundles are isolated from the specifics of what components are 
connected to them. This isolation permits channels to be connected, disconnected and 
reconnected independently of the running program. Connections may be manipulated 
by the connected bundles or by third parties. This ability is necessary for the orches-
tration, evolution and autonomic management of deployed applications [5]. 
Within the machine infrastructure a component called the connection manager is 
responsible for the management of named channels. It maintains an associative map-
ping of names to channels. This mapping may be manipulated by other machines via 
the machines machine port and by the bundle being executed via the machine API. 
The model described thus far is a perfect virus propagation mechanism. Code may 
be executed on remote nodes and that code may create new processes, update the 
store, create name bindings and fire bundles on other thin servers. Cingal implements 
a two-level protection system. The first level of security restriction is on the firing of 
bundles. A conventional Unix or Windows style security model is not appropriate for 
thin servers, which do not have users in the conventional sense. Instead, security is 
achieved by means of digital signatures and certificates. Each thin server maintains a 
list of trusted entities, each associated with a security certificate. Entities might corre-
spond to organisations, humans or other thin servers. This data structure is maintained 
by a process called the Valid Entity Repository (VER). 
Bundles presented for firing from outwith a thin server must be signed by a valid 
entity stored in the VER. The VER maintains an associative data structure indexed by 
the entity id and mapping to a tuple including certificates and rights. Operations are 
provided for adding and removing entities from the repository. Of course these opera-
tions are subject to the second protection mechanism, which is capability-based. An 
example of a signed bundle was shown in Fig 2. 
The entity attribute of the authentication element represents the name of an entity 
in the VER of the thin server on which the bundle is being fired and the signature is 
the signed body of the bundles code payload. The thin server deployment infrastruc-
ture for deploying bundles from conventional machines provides programmers with 
methods that simplify the signing of bundles. 
The signing of bundles and their authentication on arrival at thin servers prevents 
the misuse of thin servers by unauthorised entities. However it does not prevent a 
bundle from interfering with other bundles or entities in the binder or store. It is pos-
sible for bundles to be totally isolated, giving the illusion that each is the only entity 
running on a thin server. Conversely, bundles may share resources when appropriate. 
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To address these needs, the second protection mechanism provided by thin servers 
is capability-based. In addition to the signatures stored in the VER, thin servers store 
segregated capabilities for entities stored in the store, sBinder, pBinder and the VER 
itself. Whenever a running bundle attempts an operation, the capabilities stored in the 
VER associated with the entity that invoked the operation are checked. The operation 
only proceeds if the entity holds sufficient privilege. 
3 Application Deployment 
The Cingal system provides the infrastructure for deploying components on arbitrary 
suitably enabled hosts. However, additional infrastructure is needed to a) describe 
distributed architectures, and b) deploy components from the descriptions. This infra-
structure comprises a description language, a deployment engine, and various mobile 
code documents and tools. 
The description language is an XML schema, instances of which are Deployment 
Description Documents (DDDs). Each DDD contains an architectural description of 
an application, comprising a set of autonomous software components, the hosts on 
which they are to execute, and the interconnections between them. 
The deployment engine takes a DDD as input and deploys the components de-
scribed in it on the appropriate hosts. These components are pushed to the hosts as 
Cingal bundles; every participating host is Cingal-enabled. The deployment engine 
also pushes various tools to the hosts to carry out local deployment tasks in situ, prin-
cipally installing and initialising the components, and configuring the interconnection 
topology of the deployed application. These tools are also transferred as bundles. 
The data element of a tool bundle includes a control document called a to-do list. 
This contains a set of tasks to be attempted by the tool when it arrives and is fired on 
the destination thin server. When the tool completes these tasks, it sends a task report 
document back to the deployment engine, listing the outcomes of each task and any 
other associated information. Examples of associated information might include the 
GUIDs of stored bundles, or the names of channels and machines. 
The three primary tools are installers, runners and wirers. An installer installs an 
arbitrary number of payload bundles into the store of the destination thin server. A 
runner starts the execution of a number of bundles previously installed in the store. A 
wirer is responsible for making concrete connections between pairs of components 
using the named channel mechanism. 
Under control of these tools, each application component on a thin server moves 
between the following states: 
• installed: when the bundle has been installed into the store 
• running: when the bundle has been fired and started computation; any reads or 
writes on named channels will block since they are not connected 
• wired: when the bundle has started computation and all named channels have been 
connected to other components 
During initial deployment of an application the constituent components move from 
installed to running to wired. During subsequent evolution the components may 
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move from wired to running to wired again, in cases where only the interconnection 
topology needs to change, or from wired to running to installed to running to wired 
again, in cases where components need to be moved to different hosts in the network. 
Each instance of a deployment tool is pushed to the appropriate host as a bundle 
containing a fixed code element depending on its type (i.e. installer, runner or wirer), 
and a data element configured to its particular role. Thus every installer bundle con-
tains the same generic installer implementation (currently a Java class), which is spe-
cialised by the bundle payloadand similarly for runners and wirers. 
The example installer bundle shown in Fig 3 contains the installer code: the class 
uk.ac.stand.cingal.Installer. The payload carries another bundle, itself containing the 
classes Server and CacheUpdater, and a to-do list specifying that that bundle (identi-
fied by the id attribute value "urn:cingal:a222jdjd2s") should be installed. 
<BUNDLE> 
 <AUTHENTICATION  entity="197301m7wWwrPxX9..EySLGU" 
        signature="kUdzrv6T..fFNn5Kap" /> 
 <CODE entry="uk.ac.stand.cingal.Installer" type="java"> 
  <CLASS name="uk.ac.stand.cingal.Installer"> 
   5leLKJJbnQBAAMoKU 
  </CLASS> 
 </CODE> 
 <DATA> 
  <DATUM id="urn:cingal:a222jdjd2s"> 
   <BUNDLE> 
    <AUTHENTICATION  entity="1973012..91509" 
           signature="DQowLAIUNs..if1Dn5Kap" /> 
    <CODE entry="Server" type="java"> 
     <CLASS name="Server"> 
      5lHRHAJMnQDD43MoKU 
     </CLASS> 
     <CLASS name="CacheUpdater"> 
      5leHdkvjidfjFFFDDEEU 
     </CLASS> 
    </CODE> 
    <DATA /> 
   </BUNDLE> 
  </DATUM> 
  <DATUM id="ToDoList"> 
   <TODOLIST> 
    <TASK guid="urn:cingal:aEcncdeEe" type="INSTALL"> 
     <DATUM id="PayloadRef"> 
      urn:cingal:a222jdjd2s 
     </DATUM> 
    </TASK> 
   </TODOLIST> 
  </DATUM> 
 </DATA> 
</BUNDLE> 
Fig 3: An installer bundle 
Examples of runners and wirers are shown in Figs 2 and 6 respectively. 
A DDD is a static description of a distributed graph of components; an example is 
shown in Fig 4. It specifies the locations of the required components (bundles), the 
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hosts available, the mapping of components to hosts (deployments) and the connec-
tions between named channel pairs. 
<DDD name="ServerAndCacheApplication"> 
 <BUNDLES> 
  <BUNDLE name="Server" source="file://C:\bundles\server.xml" /> 
  <BUNDLE name="Cache" source="file://C:\bundles\cache.xml" /> 
 </BUNDLES> 
 <HOSTS> 
  <HOST id="A" address="129.127.8.34" /> 
  <HOST id="B" address ="129.127.8.35" /> 
 </HOSTS> 
 <DEPLOYMENTS> 
  <DEPLOYMENT name="PrimaryServer" bundle="Server" target="A" /> 
  <DEPLOYMENT name="CachingServer" bundle="Cache" target="B" /> 
 </DEPLOYMENTS> 
 <CONNECTIONS> 
  <CONNECTION> 
   <SOURCE  deployment="PrimaryServer" 
       channel="DownstreamCache" /> 
   <DESTINATION deployment="CachingServer" 
       channel="UpstreamServer" /> 
  </CONNECTION> 
 </CONNECTIONS> 
</DDD> 
Fig 4: A Deployment Description Document 
The first phase of application deployment involves installation of component bundles 
on appropriate hosts. The deployment engine reads a DDD and retrieves the specified 
bundles from their given locations (which may be within a local file-based component 
catalogue or elsewhere on the network). It then configures an installer bundle for each 
host by generating an appropriate to-do list. These installers are fired as illustrated in 
Fig 1 on the participating thin servers throughout the network. The action of each 
executing installer bundle on arrival is to extract its payload component bundles and 
add them to the local store. It then sends a task report back to the deployment engine 
listing the resulting store keys of the installed bundles, and terminates. 
The second phase of application deployment involves starting execution of the previ-
ously installed dormant component bundles on the appropriate thin servers. The 
deployment engine configures a runner bundle for each thin server, by generating an 
appropriate to-do list, and fires it on that thin server. The action of each executing 
runner bundle on arrival is to extract the relevant bundle(s) from the local store, and 
to fire these in turn. Fig 2 shows an example runner bundle, containing the store key 
(labelled as StoreGuid) of the bundle to be extracted and fired. As with the installa-
tion process, the runner sends a task report back to the deployment engine, in this 
case listing the connectors of the enclosing machine for each fired bundle. This will 
enable the deployment engine to communicate with the newly running bundles in the 
final wiring phase. The process is illustrated in Fig 5, in which a runner is fired on 
thin server A. The runner retrieves the Server bundle from As store and fires it in a 
new machine, and returns a task report to the deployment engine. 
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Fig 5: The running process 
The final phase of application deployment involves connecting (termed wiring) the 
named channels on the running bundles to assemble the global application topology. 
The deployment engine configures a wirer bundle for each connection, by generating 
an appropriate to-do list. The wiring process will begin on one of the thin servers 
selected arbitrarily. Each wirer created is configured with a to-do list describing: 
1. The connector for each machinethis contains the IP address of the machine and 
the machine and resource ports. 
2. The name used by the executing bundle to reference the channel in both machines 
(this may be different for each machine). 
Fig 6 shows an example wirer bundle for thin server A, which is (arbitrarily) chosen 
as the initiating thin server for the connection between the named channels Down-
streamCache and UpstreamServer. Note that this bundle cannot be generated by the 
deployment engine until it has received the task reports from the runner bundles, 
since those contain the necessary port numbers. 
The executing wirer bundle is able to communicate with the relevant machines 
connection manager via its machine channel. In the example, the wirer executing on 
thin server A requests that the machine containing the running Server bundle create a 
new named channel with the name DownstreamCache. In response to this request, the 
machines connection manager also starts a thread listening for incoming TCP/IP 
socket connections, and returns the port number to the wirer. 
The wiring must now be completed by having the machine containing the running 
Cache bundle on thin server B connect to A on that port. To achieve this, the wirer on 
A configures another wirer bundle (its offspring), which is fired on B. The purpose 
of the offspring wirer is to connect the named channel on B to the waiting channel on 
A. When the offspring wirer arrives at B, it communicates with the connection man-
ager of the appropriate machine and instructs it to create a new named channel Up-
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streamServer and connect it to the DownstreamCache channel by communicating 
with the listening port on A, thus establishing the connection. This process is illus-
trated in Fig 7. 
 
<BUNDLE> 
 <AUTHENTICATION entity="1973073447eb91509" 
       signature=" CS68m..+SLGU" /> 
 <CODE entry="uk.ac.stand.cingal.Wirer" type="java"> 
  <CLASS name="uk.ac.stand.cingal.Wirer"> 
   sdjskF2YS9GFGSDnL09fdsa 
  </CLASS> 
 </CODE> 
 <DATA> 
  <DATUM id="ToDoList"> 
   <TODOLIST> 
    <TASK guid="urn:cingal:322xf344" type="WIRE"> 
     <DATUM id="PrimaryConnector"> 
      <CONNECTOR host="129.127.8.34" 
           machinePort="30112" 
           resourcePort="29000" /></DATUM> 
     <DATUM id="SecondaryConnector"> 
      <CONNECTOR host="129.127.8.35" 
           machinePort="47121" 
           resourcePort="26083" /></DATUM> 
     <DATUM id="PrimaryNamedChannel"> 
      DownstreamCache</DATUM> 
     <DATUM id="SecondaryNamedChannel"> 
      UpstreamServer</DATUM> 
    </TASK> 
   </TODOLIST> 
  </DATUM> 
 </DATA> 
</BUNDLE> 
Fig 6: A wirer bundle 
 
Fig 7: The wiring process 
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Once all the wirers have completed their (possibly parallel) computation, the wiring 
process is complete and the named channels are connected as shown in Fig 8. This 
completes the deployment of the distributed application. 
 
 
Fig 8: Result of wiring process 
4 Related Work 
The OSGi Service Platform [6] has perhaps the most in common with this work; it 
addresses similar issues of remote installation and management of software compo-
nents, and (independently) adopts similar terminology for bundles and wiring. The 
most significant difference is the lack of high-level declarative architectural descrip-
tions. This arises from it being targeted primarily at software deployment onto smart 
and embedded devices, whereas Cingal is aimed more generally at deployment and 
evolution of distributed applications on the basis of explicit architectural descriptions. 
As mentioned in Section 6, we are currently working on generating these descriptions 
automatically from high-level goals specified as constraints, to allow automatic re-
configuration and deployment in response to observed run-time problems such as host 
or network failure. Another difference is in the wiring model: a given OSGi bundle 
can be a producer and/or a consumer, and all its associated wires are conceptually 
equivalent. Cingal allows any number of symbolically named ports to be associated 
with a bundle, and the programmer may treat these differently. However, the two 
schemes have equivalent modelling power. Finally, Cingal is more flexible with re-
gards to initial provisioning: its ubiquitous fire service allows bundles to be pushed to 
a new node from a remote management agent without any intervention required lo-
cally on the node. Initial provisioning in OSGi involves pull from a new node, which 
must be initialised somehow with an address from which to pull the code. The ad-
dress may be provided by various means such as direct user intervention, factory 
installation, reading from a smartcard, etc. 
A number of languages have been developed to describe software architectures, 
including [7-9]. Typical of these is Acme [1], which is intended to fulfil three roles: 
to provide an architectural interchange format for design tools, to provide a founda-
tion for the design of new tools and to support architectural modelling. The Acme 
language supports the description of components joined via connectors, which pro-
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vide a variety of communication styles. Components and connectors may be anno-
tated with properties that specify attributes such as source files and degrees of concur-
rency, etc. Acme also supports a logical formalism based on relations and constraints, 
which permits computational or run-time behaviour to be associated with the descrip-
tion of architectures. Acme does not support the deployment of systems from the 
architectural descriptions, nor does it encompass physical computation resources. 
The ArchWare ADL [10] is based on higher-order π-calculus, and is aimed at 
specifying active architectures, in which the architectural description of an applica-
tion evolves in lock-step with the application itself. The language supports a reversi-
ble compose operator that allows components to be assembled from other compo-
nents, and later decomposed and recomposed to permit evolution. Decomposition 
operates at a fine-grain, and it is possible to decompose a component into constituent 
parts without losing encapsulated state. This is achieved using hyper-code [11], which 
provides a reified form for both code and data. In comparison, the ArchWare ADL 
focuses on software architecture and does not address physical deployment. 
The idea of installing components using agents has its roots in a number of places. 
Java Servlets were initially developed within Sun Labs with the express purpose of 
freeing the restrictions of a fixed repertoire service, allowing the client to modify the 
behaviour of the server. However, as they moved into a commercial product domain, 
this flexibility was removed as it was deemed to compromise the security of the un-
derlying traditional operating system [12]. The Infospheres project from Caltech [13] 
has some overlap with the system described here. They propose a system of distrib-
uted Java processes (dapplets), which can be connected using asynchronous message 
passing. 
The Tacoma system [14] uses agent technology to install software on remote ma-
chines and like our system uses digital signatures to verify the authenticity of agents. 
Tacoma introduces the notions of a briefcase to carry agent payloads, which may 
include components, and a cabinet, which is a persistent site bound briefcase, corre-
sponding closely to our store. However, the Tacoma system appears to be aimed at 
installing non-distributed applications on remote nodes and does not include the no-
tion of distributed components, communication channels nor high-level architectural 
descriptions. 
5 Conclusions 
At the start of this paper six claims were made about our deployment architecture3. In 
conclusion, these claims are critically re-examined. 
Claim 1: The Cingal infrastructure permits bundles to be deployed in arbitrary 
geographic locations from conventional machines. Bundles may perform arbitrary 
computation and offer arbitrary network services. 
                                                          
3 The current implementation may be downloaded from 
http://www-systems.dcs.st-and.ac.uk/cingal/downloads/. 
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Claim 2: The runtime infrastructure provided by Cingal thin servers abstracts over 
host-specific differences yielding a homogeneous run-time environment for deployed 
components. 
Claim 3: The store and binder provided by thin servers support content-addressed 
storage, which permits code and data to be stored with no possibility of ambiguous 
retrieval. The binder permits objects to be symbolically named to facilitate the re-
trieval of components whose content keys are not known. The binder also provides an 
evolution point supporting update of component mappings. 
Claim 4: Deployment Description Documents support the specification of distrib-
uted architectures. The deployment engine technology combined with the thin server 
infrastructure permits these distributed deployments to be realised into running in-
stances of component based architectures. The process of deployment from specifica-
tion through to having a connected collection of running components on distributed 
hosts is totally automated. 
Claim 5: A number of novel evolution mechanisms are provided by the architec-
ture. Firstly, the architecture supports the ability to remotely update components. 
Secondly flexible binding between components is made possible thorough the binder 
and store interfaces. Most importantly, distributed architectures may be re-arranged 
by unbinding and reconnecting named channels within machines running on thin 
servers. 
Claim 6: The two security mechanisms provided by Cingal prevent unauthorised 
entities from firing bundles on hosts on which they do not have privilege. The owner-
ship model which makes uses of standard cryptographic certificate techniques is well 
suited to distributed deployment. Tools (not described here) that operate in a similar 
manner to the deployment tool are provided for managing entity privileges and updat-
ing collections of machines. The capability protection system provided within Cingal 
thin servers prevents bundles being used for malicious or unintentional abuse of the 
thin server infrastructure. 
6 Future Work 
In the future we propose to expand the system in two primary ways. Firstly we would 
like to make the specification of distributed components more declarative. To this end 
we are currently investigating the use of constraint based specification languages. It is 
our intention to construct higher level specifications and a set of tools to support them 
and compile these specifications down to DDD documents. Secondly, we are investi-
gating how evolution can be specified at the DDD level. Since we use DDDs to spec-
ify deployments, it seems natural to have high-level descriptions of evolution and 
automatically generate bundles to enact the necessary changes. Another interesting 
line of investigation is the use of a higher level specification of architectural intent 
from which DDDs may be generated. We are currently investigating the use of con-
straint based specification languages for this purpose [5]. We believe that this ap-
proach may be combined with the infrastructure described in this paper to yield sys-
tems that are capable of autonomic evolution in the face of perturbations such as host 
and link failure, temporary bandwidth problems, etc. We postulate that it will be 
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feasible to implement an autonomic manager that will automatically evolve the de-
ployed application to maintain the constraints while it is in operation. 
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